Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today on behalf of CUPE Local 1925 representing the Saint John Ports Canada Police.
The Port of Saint John is Canada’s fourth largest seaport and dates from 1843. The port has had an enviable history of success and continues to enjoy record-breaking traffic volumes today. As of June 30, 1996, all traffic volumes had increased this year, including shipments of potash up by 30 per cent, forest products up 45 per cent, and salt up by 181 per cent. With such traffic activity, the port makes an important contribution to the New Brunswick and Eastern Canadian economies.
Our modern history as a trade union representing the Saint John Ports Canada Police dates from 1968 when the then National Harbours Board reorganized its several previously autonomous police and security forces into a national force with port police detachments and headquarters in Ottawa.
We were originally certified under the Canada Labour Code by the Canada Labour Relations Board as Local 60610 of the Public Service Alliance of Canada and included in a bargaining unit consisting of all port employees. On May 9, 1975, the CLRB certified the port’s police and security department as a separate bargaining unit (covering constables, corporals and sergeants) and we became CUPE Local 1925 on July 14, 1975. Of the 23 employees in 1975 who constituted the port’s police force, nineteen officers became members of the bargaining unit represented by CUPE Local 1925.
Today, there are ten employees remaining part of the Ports Canada Police service in Saint John, consisting of nine full-time police officers and one civilian employee. Of these, seven officers have over 20 years of service and have extensive experience and training in all aspects of port policing matters, including seaport security and anti-terrorism. It is from this perspective of over 150 years of practical, hands on experience with port policing in a large Canadian seaport that we offer you our views and recommendations concerning Bill C-44, the Canada Marine Act.
While this legislation and the government’s new marine policy cover many issues, we would like to confine ourselves today to one very important aspect of these new regimes, namely port policing.
We believe that the government’s intention contained in Section 126 of Bill C-44 to disband the Ports Canada Police across Canada will have major negative impacts on all Canadian citizens and port users. With the elimination of the Canada Ports Corporation, the requirement for Saint John (and other major ports) to maintain and pay for a detachment of CPC police will disappear. The Saint John Ports Canada Police service will be “disbanded”, as will be the case for other ports police detachments. Not only will well-qualified and experienced police officers lose their jobs, but port and community protection will be lost as well.
This threatened job loss, which began with the release of this Standing Committee’s report entitled A National Marine Strategy in May 1995, has put our members and their families under great anxiety and stress over the last 18 months. The uncertainty over the future of Saint John port policing has also disturbed many Saint John citizens. This Committee’s refusal to travel to Saint John to hear those concerned about adequate port policing has only added to the growing public perception that the federal government does not care about adequate port policing in Saint John and elsewhere.
We hope that this Standing Committee takes decisive action to put these fears to rest. While our arguments are based on our perspectives as Saint John Ports Canada Police, we believe our arguments are applicable to all of Canada’s other major ports. We ask SCOT to heed our recommendations and amend Bill C-44 accordingly.
We offer our arguments under the following headings:
I. Lack of proper analysis and consultation.
II. The nature of ports police: a) Specialized nature. b) Private security guards are no substitute for public ports police.
III. Negative consequences for the municipality and its police force.
IV. The national role of ports and their financing.
V. Conclusion and recommendations: a) Role of ports police. b) Powers of ports police. c) Funding for ports police.
I. Lack of Proper Analysis and Consultation
SCOT’s May 1995 A National Marine Strategy devotes only eight lines of its report justifying the majority conclusion that “ports should be allowed to make their own arrangements regarding policing and security”. The only reason offered to “justify” this conclusion is the statement that “all of the LPCs stated that they could reduce their police costs if they had responsibility for them”. This was part of the report’s repeated emphasis on the need to “take unnecessary costs out of the ports system” and about “cutting costs, reducing subsidies and becoming more competitive in the marine sector”.
But the cost of port policing has already been falling, as reported by Judge René Marin in his September 1992 external review of Ports Canada Police:
“The police have responded positively to these pressures (to reduce costs) and have reduced in number from a level of about 300 in 1975 to 180 today. Police costs, as a percentage of port revenues, have declined from a national average of about 9% in 1975 to 6% in 1991. These figures compare favourably with the experience in other countries such as the United States, where police costs represent an average of 12-14% of port revenues.”
Remarkably, SCOT’s majority report did not make any reference to this available data. Nor did the report take into consideration the public interest and why dedicated port policing existed in the first place.
Within a month of the release of SCOT’s report, however, the so-called “Roche” report was prepared as a plan to dismantle Ports Police. There was no consultation with policing agencies or the provinces that would be directly affected by the abolition of the Ports Police.
With the appointment of Transport Minister David Anderson, a review was to be conducted at each of the six ports with a CPC detachment, including the Port of Saint John. Not surprisingly, each site-specific report subsequently concluded that CPC police duties at these ports could be effectively and efficiently provided by municipal police forces.
It is important to understand how these reports were conducted. In the case of the Port of Saint John, the mandate of the review was set narrowly: “a review of each port’s safety and security requirements and the identification of the best means of fully meeting them, absent a dedicated police force”. While we had made our concerns known to Transport Minister Anderson on April 23 and Saint John Mayor Shirley McAlary on April 22, there was no representation from CUPE Local 1925 on the Port of Saint John Security Review Committee. We were given less than half a working day’s notice to appear before the Committee to offer our views on June 24, 1996, after their report had already been sent to Transport Canada.
Appendix “A” to this brief contains an extract from our analysis of the Port of Saint John Security Review Committee’s report which was presented to Saint John’s Mayor and Common Council. As you will read this analysis, the Review Committee’s recommendations benefit operators and users of the port by transferring $800,000 of port policing costs from their user pockets to the City of Saint John and its municipal police force.
It is therefore not surprising that we were excluded from this Review Committee’s deliberations until its suspect and conflict-ridden recommendations were produced although operators and users were represented on this committee.
But the Port of Saint John’s Security Review is not the only one that is similarly suspect. At the request of Transport Minister Anderson, the six site-specific policing reports (for St. John’s, Halifax, Saint John, Québec, Montreal and Vancouver) were forwarded to the Canadian Police Association and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police for their analysis and comment. As reported to you on October 21, the Canadian Police Association concluded that all six reports were “equally improperly structured and their ultimate recommendations are thus equally tainted” to save money at the expense of the public interest.
II. The Nature of Ports Police
In addition to the obvious financial conflict of interest animating the Port of Saint John’s Security Review, the report is based on two fundamental misconceptions concerning the role of ports police, as described by Peter Glennie, Chairman of the Saint John Port Corporation, to the City of Saint John Common Council on August 12, 1996:
a) That the city’s harbour and port lands do not need more policing than any other municipal taxpaying industry. If there is any policing that is needed, it can be done by the municipal police force.
b) That most port users shipping lines and terminals can take responsibility for their own security by hiring private security guards and erecting fences around their compounds. In other words, much of the work done by ports police can be replaced by security guards, closed gates and higher fences.
These are two dangerous myths that obscure the real nature of ports police.
a) Specialized Nature of Ports Police
It is commonly acknowledged that the reason Ports Canada Police came into being in the first place as a dedicated ports policing agency was because of crime and corruption in the ports during the 1960s. This was precisely the conclusion of Judge René Marin in his September 1992 External Review of Protective Services for the Canada Ports Corporation:
“A major factor leading to this decision (to keep national Ports police) was concern expressed by the industry and governments alike, that the break-up of the National Harbours Board Police could lead to a degradation of security within the ports and a return to the problems which led to its formation in 1969. In particular, provinces and the industry were fearful that policing standards and services would be dictated more by commercial or “bottom line” considerations than by actual need. The industry argued as well that the problems of policing the ports differ in important respects from those encountered in other settings and demand the presence of a dedicated and specialized service with a thorough understanding of the port operating environment. The policing provisions of the National Harbours Board Act, therefore, were carried forward to the Canada Ports Corporation Act. In addition, the experience gained by the port police in port operations and the special relationship within the marine “community” have drawn them into a number of enforcement areas which serve the public interest. These include providing support and assistance to the enforcement efforts of other federal agencies such as Revenue Canada (Customs), Employment and Immigration, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Defence and Transport Canada (Coast Guard).” (p. 11, emphasis added)
This was also the conclusion of Mr. George Soper, Retired Director, Saint John Ports Canada Police, writing in the Saint John Times-Globe on May 21, 1996:
“In 1968, Saint John had a security force which was unable to cope with the policing requirements of a national port. Consequently, theft of cargo, smuggling, drug offences, morals offences, assaults, wilful damage, impaired driving, traffic and liquor offences, etc., were common occurrences. The unit was reorganized, retrained where possible, and new recruits hired to set up a force of legally sworn police officers. With the full backing of the Crown prosecutors office, the courts, port management and the support of the national police forces, the port of Saint John gradually gained the reputation of a safe, low loss, low crime port. A good reputation can only be gained by consistent performance over the years. Unfortunately it can be lost in a very short time. The countries of the world call at our port. They demand and, yes, they deserve a very high standard of port policing or they quietly fade away to the competition.” (emphasis added)
Safe, low loss and low crime ports are only possible when they have specialized port police forces that are an integral part of the intelligence and enforcement community responsible for policing under the following acts:
Criminal Code of Canada Young Offenders Act Identification of Criminals Act Narcotic Control Act Customs Act Immigration Act Canada Shipping Act Official Secrets Act Privacy Act Government Property Traffic Act Emergency Preparedness Act Seize Property Management Act Security Offenses Act Canada Ports Corporation By Law A-1 Motor Vehicle Act Liquor Control Act
The breadth of these responsibilities are described in greater detail in Appendix “B” of our brief which contains the “Reference Guidelines” prepared by the Canada Ports Corporation Protective Services Program.
With this broad mandate of protection of persons and property under the Canada Ports Corporation Act, port policing must be proactive, not reactive.
In the case of the Port of Saint John, more than 75 per cent of the unit’s time is spent in proactive policing, such as patrols and surveillance. A wide range of calls are fielded each year, including harbour rescues, ship searches, pollution control, contraband and trafficking in stolen goods and narcotics, illegal immigration and terrorist activities. For example, last year the Saint John Ports Canada Police in conjunction with Canada Customs detected and recovered over $300,000 in stolen automobiles being shipped through the Port of Saint John. Finally, the port’s “marine division” (operating the “Muskrat”) is on the water an average of over 100 hours per year dealing with oil pollution, customs searches, assisting vessels in trouble, cruise ship security, trespassing missing persons and other situations within the harbour’s limits.
Policing a port is also far different than policing a municipality.
The community within a port is significantly different from the traditional residential and business communities within a municipality. A special knowledge of existing and potential policing and security related requirements within each port facility is required. It is also imperative that the police within the port develop a good understanding of the inherent culture of this unique community, and an ability to empathize with their problems.
Judge Marin in his 1992 report identified six essential characteristics of a port police as endorsed by port users:
a) Physical location and a continuous presence within the confines of the port, to ensure availability of resources and flexibility in their deployment.
b) Continuous patrol service.
c) Adoption of the “community policing” philosophy, i.e., continuous consultation with port authorities and users with respect to problem definition and resolution, and preventive programs.
d) Development of specialized expertise relative to ports security, e.g., a high degree of familiarity with documentation relating to shipping. (Port security in its totality lies outside the competence of the Harbour Master because of the requirement for peace officer status for some functions.)
e) Development of a high level of expertise with respect to planning for emergency situations, in cooperation with the Harbour Master.
f) A career development program which maintains a high level of specialized expertise within clearly defined parameters, but one which facilitates structured recruitment and training initiatives based on a limited, but desirable, rate of attrition.
By way of contrast, current municipal police forces do not have the personnel, orientation or funds to take on these port police functions. For example, it is not the policy of municipal police to patrol private property, including federally owned property. They generally use “reactive” and not “proactive” policing tactics, and only respond to “calls for service” reported by the public. They are assigned duties on the basis of a “shift system”, meaning police officers with generalized skills responding to “calls for service” may be completely unfamiliar with port topography, location of wharfs, terminals and ships, and may become even lost responding to “calls for service”.
Finally, Table 1 shows that transferring port policing responsibilities to municipal police forces has not proven to be successful in other jurisdictions. In our view, the lessons are clear: ports policing is a specialized service that requires more resources and skills than those possessed by municipal police forces.
TABLE 1
Policing Experiences at Other Major North American Ports
Abolishing dedicated port policing and relying on alternative service delivery has been suggested or tried at other major North American ports. Consistently, it has been determined that the unique features of port policing do not lend themselves to alternative service delivery such as reliance on municipal police agencies. At some centres, the port police have dual responsibility for airports and seaports.
A sample of experiences with abolishing dedicated police:
· At the PORT OF TORONTO, port policing was absorbed by municipal police. Experience proved that the degree of specialization required for port-related policing requires a dedicated service and a specialized Marine Unit was created.
· At the PORT OF BOSTON, dedicated policing services were withdrawn in favour of relying on city resources. Without a dedicated fully-empowered police agency to target violations of environmental laws, pollution in the Boston Harbour increased ten-fold within six months. Boston has reinstated its dedicated port police.
· At the PORT OF BALTIMORE, the dedicated police agency was disbanded and replaced with state police. The results were unsatisfactory for the port and a dedicated port police agency was reconstituted.
· At the PORT OF MIAMI, dedicated policing was disbanded in favour of sharing police services with the city. As of October 1995 the reported consequences are that crime is rampant within the port area. Captain Frank Nicol, president of the Shipping Federation of Canada, cited Miami as “an example not to follow”.
· At the PORT OF LOS ANGELES, in early 1995, the Port Corporation proposed disbanding the dedicated port police agency in order to cut its costs. The recommendations were discredited upon external review and the proposal did not proceed.
· In the PORT OF SEATTLE, the dedicated police agency was reduced in size in order to cut costs. Security services that were contracted to supplement the police have been given special law enforcement powers, including the right to carry weapons.
Prepared by the British Columbia Attorney General, March 20, 1996
b) Private Security Guards Are No Substitute for Public Ports Police
While private security agencies and guard services may have a role to play at ports, they do not have the requisite training, orientation, access to national police services or powers to replace port police.
Based on studies in the U.S. and Canada, “private police” forces are characterized by low wages; minimal or no recruitment standards; an emphasis on part-time work; high turnover; and poor education with minimum or no training. As Judge René Marin concluded during his March 1995 overview of the privatization of police at a workshop held by the International Association of Airport and Seaport Police in Florida, one faces the following “realities” of private police:
“a) The absence of standards. They go from mediocre to good.
b) It is a purchase of service often without a guarantee of quality because of turnover of personnel.
c) Last minute fill-in for permanent people.
d) No specialization.
e) Age can vary from young to quite old with very few in between.
f) Little or no supervision.”
On the other hand, public police force members have better education and experience; better pay (which reduces turnover); training and standards.
Private security guards also have a narrow service orientation: to “babysit” the property of port users. The “public interest” and “duty of care” at the port will be lost when dedicated ports police are disbanded. For example, a number of American ports have tried replacing their dedicated ports police with private security guards and found it to be a disaster. Their control of contraband, illegal drugs, exporting stolen goods and other serious crimes was destroyed. The cost savings of the use of private police quickly evaporated under these circumstances.
This was precisely the conclusion of Judge René Marin’s September 1992 external review of port policing. His report rejected the idea of replacing public ports police with private security guards:
“Private security agencies, while particularly well suited for a variety of guard functions, are not adequately trained and experienced to perform the diverse functions of a peace officer within the ports system. Traditionally, private security agencies have been unable to develop effective professional working relationships with accredited police agencies, and are not granted access to a variety of National Police Services so crucial to success today. Employees of private security agencies and other guard services do not have peace officer status. They are, for the most part, transient in nature and have no commitment to permanency in a specific job. There is little or no control of the supply of personnel by the parent organization, nor of their level or knowledge or police skills. Private security agencies should not be considered an appropriate source of policing services for the ports.” (emphasis added)
This was also the conclusion of the City of Toronto when the Toronto Harbour Commission decided to terminate its Harbour Patrol. The study done by the City of Toronto through the Metropolitan Toronto Police concluded that security guards were not an alternative and it was the decision to integrate the members of the Toronto Harbour Patrol with that of the Metropolitan Police Force as a separate marine division. Their decision was based on the unsuccessful use of security personnel in other ports and they felt that the expertise of the personnel already in place was too valuable to replace.
Finally, private security guards are not empowered to enforce provincial or Canadian laws. With the repeal of Section 22 of the current Canada Ports Corporation Act and its replacement with Section 96 of Bill C-44, port enforcement officers will no longer have the powers of police officers.
This is a serious shortcoming of private security police and Bill C-44’s “enforcement officers”. They will not be empowered by law to take required police action in the public interest. Nor will they have the same deterrent effect that armed police officers do. As George Soper wrote in the case of the Port of Saint John:
“It was tried in the past with security guards being responsible for the port. It did not work. It would not be effective now. Guards are not empowered by law to take the required police action.”
III. Negative Consequences for the Municipality and Its Police Force
Another important area ignored by the Port of Saint John Security Review Committee is the impact of its recommendations on the City of Saint John and its police force.
With its proposal to disband the dedicated port police force, we believe, as we have tried to show, that the Port of Saint John will become known as an “open” port for exporting stolen goods; drug and contraband importing; entry of illegal immigrants; terrorism activities and a lack of safety for the people who use port facilities.
City police officers and firefighters with some private security guards will not have the resources or ability to control the exporting of stolen property; importing of contraband and illegal drugs; immigration checks; reporting of oil pollution or other serious crimes associated with a port environment. This will subject the citizens of Saint John to higher crime potential associated with the criminal element knowing the Port of Saint John does not have a dedicated port police force. The use of security guards will allow oil pollution to go undetected and prove self serving for the port users and environmentally disastrous for the public waterways.
The Saint John Port Corporation’s plan will also dump many of its current policing functions on to the City of Saint John police force. With only a few security guards stationed on the port property, the transfer of all policing functions to the municipal police force would create an impossible “drain” on the already depleted City police force.
CUPE Local 61, representing the City of Saint John police officers, will have much more to say on this matter. For our purposes, it is important to note that the municipal police force already has over 60,000 calls for service each year in addition to many thousands of self-initiated activities. The City of Saint John municipal police force cannot function at a level required to protect the citizens of Saint John if they are going to be required to also handle the policing requirements at the Port. The Saint John Police Force has shrunk from 197 to now only 169 officers policing a City of 125 square miles. There is absolutely no way the Saint John Police Force can absorb the police calls for service that will be generated at the Port when the dedicated port police unit is disbanded. City police officers are also not trained in ports policing functions nor do they have a marine Unit.
A number of “on water” rescue functions performed by the present Ports Canada Police will also be shifted over to the Saint John firefighters. This would result in increasing the response time to present calls from citizens for City fire and life rescue situations. The present water enforcement functions would not be performed by City of Saint John firefighters and will quickly become a thing of the past.
Finally, the port users are attempting to achieve $800,000 in cost savings for themselves by “downloading” the cost of port policing onto the City of Saint John and its taxpayers. This strategy will allow even greater profits to be made by the port, its operators and its users.
Bill C-44 proposes to add further insult to this injury.
Currently, the Saint John Port Corporation pays grants in lieu of municipal taxes to the City of Saint John worth between $260,000 and $350,000 annually, less than half the amount any other owner would have paid in property taxes for a similar amount of industrial land. The municipal taxpayers of Saint John are therefore confronted with a tremendous double whammy as a result of the Security Review Committee’s recommendations: the increased costs of policing a port with $350,000 less in revenue from the port itself and less police and fire protection on the streets of Saint John.
Moreover, the Saint John Port Corporation is pursuing this strategy despite Transport Minister Anderson’s explicit May 10, 1996 commitment to the Attorney General of British Columbia to the contrary:
“I wish to emphasize my view that this position must be, and is consistent with general direction to the ports that there be no “off-loading” of costs to other levels of government. Any requirements the port of Vancouver may have for police services beyond “regular” services, as provided to all municipal taxpayers, would have to be negotiated with the proper authorities and be the subject of a compensatory agreement.” (emphasis added)
To date, the Port of Saint John has not indicted a willingness to follow the Minister’s direction in this regard.
IV. The National Role of Ports and Their Financing
This conflict between the Port of Saint John and its users, on the one hand, and the City of Saint John, its police force and firefighters and municipal taxpayers on the other, is a direct result of SCOT’s failure in May 1995 to provide a proper funding mechanism for our port’s essentially national functions when it comes to ports policing.
The background to SCOT’s Recommendation 6A notes that because “LPCs will not be Crown Corporations, they will not have to pay grants in lieu”. Instead, the ports in the new system as “good corporate citizens” should “negotiate with their respective municipalities appropriate fees for the services they use”. Unfortunately, this majority recommendation has proven to be too simplistic in the real world. Instead, as both the Bloc Québécois and Reform Party indicated in their dissents to SCOT’s majority report, this recommendation has become a source of conflict between municipalities and port administrations. Nor is this conflict resolved in Bill C-44.
The reality of Bill C-44, as it stands now, is that it allows ports to download their policing costs onto municipalities with the elimination of the requirement for payment of grants in lieu, totalling some $17 million a year for all of Canada’s ports. The abolition of a dedicated national ports police is also allowing ports to substitute national policing with municipal “drive-by” policing concentrating only on site security and the private property of port users thereby further straining already limited municipal police forces.
While this may be a “rational” outcome for port administrators and their users under the federal government’s new marine policy, it does not serve national safety and security interests. Ports are not confined solely to the private commercial objective of simply sending out goods to the world. Rather, ports admit goods and people into the country, thereby creating a compelling need for public control of policing to enforce the laws of Canada and the Provinces for what goes on at a port and comes through a port. About 85 per cent of the cargo handled by ports is shipped from or goes to points outside the port area.
These public interests cannot be sacrificed to the private interests of port administrators and users who do not necessarily concern themselves with criminal or other police matters which do not directly affect the employer’s business interests. But without an on-site, public police force to do this essential police work, the ports would once again become “dirty” crime-ridden ports losing their customers as they once were in the 1960s.
We believe this is not the objective of the current federal government.
In their September 29, 1995 joint response to the SCOT report on marine policy, Minister of Transport Doug Young and Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Brian Tobin stated that “the impact of greater autonomy for local ports is being examined to ensure that our commitment to safety and security is not diluted and that taxpayer interests are protected with respect to land and other assets assembled over the years with public funds” (emphasis added).
Transport Minister Doug Young, when announcing his government’s new maritime policy on December 15, 1995, stated that he wanted “to assure Canadians that we have no intention of withdrawing from port activities so as to make it easier for criminal activity to take place at the port facility (in Vancouver)”. He went on to promise that the federal and provincial governments would take the necessary legislative steps to ensure that ports police can be armed and have the powers of arrest.
Finally, Transport Minister David Anderson, in his March 25, 1996 address to the Canadian Police Association, stated that he wanted to maintain “the same level of enforcement OR BETTER” at Canada’s ports:
“We owe it to the citizens of this country to be certain that law enforcement and protection of the public will not be compromised in the transition to local autonomy for Canada’s major ports. This isn’t about cutting corners and cutting costs. For me, it’s about ensuring we get the maximum value for our law enforcement dollar. Period.” (emphasis added)
Our concluding section offers a number of amendments to Bill C-44 to ensure that it reflects the commitment we share with the federal government to have safe and secure ports.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
In order to preserve Canada’s safe, low loss and low crime ports, the following amendments are necessary for Bill C-44 in our view.
a) Role of Ports Police
As we have tried to show in our submission, there is an ongoing requirement for public and fully-empowered policing at Canada’s national ports to protect the public interest.
We therefore agree with the Canadian Police Association’s recommendation for a single, unified and cohesive nationally co-ordinated ports police force based on the retention and even expansion of the current federal Ports Canada Police. This is the most cost-effective option. At the very least, we must have public ports police location-dedicated and specialized to the port. Under no circumstances can we rely on a fragmented, reactive policing structure based on current local municipal policing agencies that already lack the resources to meet their existing public mandates.
Section 126 of Bill C-44 proposes to dissolve the Canada Ports Corporation and with it its dedicated Ports Canada Police. This is a mistake and this section cannot go ahead. In addition, Bill C-44 does not provide for clear lines of authority or public accountability for its replacement enforcement officers.
We therefore support the recommendation of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police to maintain the Ports Canada Police as a national entity and a federal responsibility. This force can be continued separately or, in the longer term, as part of a larger integrated and properly funded National Enforcement Agency as long as existing collective agreements and bargaining rights are protected.
In addition, we support the recommendation of the Canadian Police Association to amend Section 3 of Bill C-44 as follows:
“b) provide adequate and effective law enforcement so as to ensure a safe and secure port facility consistent with public safety and public interest generally in Canada;”
b) Powers of Ports Police
Bill C-44 deletes Section 22 of the current Canada Ports Corporation Act and replaces it with a new Section 96. The thrust of this section is that it allows Transport Canada to walk away from any responsibility for the appointment or control of law enforcement at the ports, whatever the status of the officers.
In the absence of peace officer status or accountability, the Minister has abdicated responsibility for the appointment of police officers for the enforcement of the public interest at ports. (Instead, enforcement officers under Bill C-44 will only protect the interests of commercial port operators.)
We therefore support the recommendation of the Canadian Police Association to amend Section 96 to continue a Ministerial responsibility for the appointment, employment, supervision and funding of public, fully empowered peace officers at Canada’s national ports.
c) Funding for Ports Police
Bill C-44 does not require the new port authorities to pay for ports policing or indeed any other municipal services.
A legislated funding mechanism for ports police is required however. In the case of the Port of Saint John, the port has ignored the need for such payments despite the Minister of Transport’s July 8, 1996 commitment to us that “if municipal police services beyond those available to the public are provided at port facilities, ports will negotiate appropriate compensation for those services”. Given this port’s track record to date, a legislated provision is required to ensure such payment happens.
But we believe that ports should not bear the total costs of ports policing alone. Given the larger public interest served by ports police in the enforcement of Canadian laws, the expenses of ports policing must continue being charged to the federal government, with the major commercial ports paying 50 per cent of these costs under a cost-recovery program.
Our proposal has the following advantages:
a) Port policing serving the public interest would be preserved at the Port of Saint John.
b) The City of Saint John municipal police force and firefighters would be able to maintain their current levels of service to the City’s municipal taxpayers.
c) The citizens of Saint John would not be exposed to higher crime rates or higher municipal taxes to subsidize the port.
d) At least seven jobs of skilled and experienced ports police would be saved.
No solution is possible unless Bill C-44 mandates our funding mechanism for a national ports police.
We request that our amendments to Bill C-44 be given favourable consideration by this Committee.
All of which is respectfully submitted,
Ports Canada Police Saint John CUPE Local 1925